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enact structural reforms to the SSDI program that address and counter the rapid growth in SSDI enrollments
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economic welfare while increasing economic output on a societal level.
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SSDI Reform: Promoting Return 
to Work without Compromising 
Economic Security 
Jagadeesh Gokhale, PhD
Social Security’s Trustees have indicated that the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) trust fund will be fully depleted by late 2016 unless the U.S. 
Congress enacts changes before then.
Lawmakers must either add resources or reduce the pro-
gram’s future benefit obligations. Without such action, 
SSDI revenues would be sufficient to pay just 81 percent 
of current-law benefits after the trust fund is exhausted.
As in years past, Congress is widely expected to 
ensure that current SSDI beneficiaries continue to be 
paid benefits at today’s levels. The most likely short-
term change would be to draw upon the resources of the 
retirement portion of Social Security—the Old Age and 
Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund. Over the longer 
term, however, the finances of both SSDI and OASI 
programs must be reformed because the combined trust 
funds are projected to be exhausted by the year 2034. In 
particular, SSDI’s history of rapid enrollment growth 
indicates serious structural deficiencies that Congress 
should seek to rectify.
As described in the Penn Wharton Public Policy 
Initiative’s August 2013 brief, “The Urgency of Reform-
ing Entitlement Programs: The Case of Social Security 
Disability Insurance,” the number of SSDI beneficiaries 
has grown at an alarming rate. From 1980 to 2013 the 
population of insured workers receiving SSDI benefits 
grew from 4.1% to 6.7%, or from 4.7 million to 11 mil-
lion people.1 Moreover, in contrast to growth in enroll-
summary
•	 With	the	Social	Security	Disability	Insurance	(SSDI)	trust	fund	on	
the	verge	of	depletion,	Congress	must	enact	structural	reforms	
to	the	SSDI	program	that	address	and	counter	the	rapid	growth	
in	SSDI	enrollments	in	recent	years.
•	This	brief	details	a	work	incentive	program	for	SSDI	beneficia-
ries,	called	the	Generalized	Benefit	Offset	(GBO),	which	would	
help	get	SSDI	recipients	back	into	the	labor	force,	enhancing	
their	own	economic	welfare	while	increasing	economic	output	
on	a	societal	level.
•	Current	SSDI	policies,	which	deny	benefits	if	beneficiaries	exceed	
a	designated	income	threshold,	create	a	disincentive	for	SSDI	
recipients	to	return	to	the	workforce.	GBO,	on	the	other	hand,	
avoids	this	disincentive	by	providing	a	subsidy	 to	 individuals	
who	rejoin	the	workforce,	while	maintaining	their	SSDI	eligibility.
•	 Introduced	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 reforms	 in	 S.	 3003	
during	the	113th	Congress,	GBO	is	an	approach	that	can	be	
combined	with	other	reforms,	and	merits	continued	evaluation	
by	lawmakers	serious	about	tackling	SSDI’s	financial	problems	
at	a	deeper	level.
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ments over the last three decades, the 
rate of terminations due to medical 
improvement or earnings above the 
Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) 
level has decreased from 29 to just 7 
per 1,000 beneficiaries.
It is thus apparent that entry 
into SSDI implies near-permanent 
dependency on the program’s benefits. 
For many beneficiaries, this is because 
of the severe nature of their medi-
cal impairments. Yet, low observed 
recovery rates may also be the result 
of the program’s rules, which preclude 
working above the SGA level and 
maintaining eligibility to SSDI ben-
efits. One study comparing cohorts of 
similar applicants suggests that more 
than one-quarter of those granted 
benefits may have residual work 
capacity.2 A different study examining 
cases at the Administrative Law Judge 
stage shows that the likelihood of 
working after being rejected for SSDI 
benefits is as high as 35 percent.3 
This brief builds on the August 
2013 brief on “The Urgency of 
Reforming Entitlement Programs,” 
introducing a way to determine 
whether SSDI beneficiaries have 
residual work capabilities. In par-
ticular, it outlines a post-entitlement 
work incentive program that would 
be economically beneficial to SSDI 
recipients and that could increase 
labor force participation and economic 
output on a societal level.4 
ThE PolIcy landScaPE 
and ThE nEEd FoR 
STRUcTURal REFoRm
Last year, at the end of the 113th 
Congress, Senator Tom Coburn 
introduced S. 3003 to the Commit-
tee on Finance “To Protect the Social 
Security Disability Insurance Program 
and Provide Other Support for Work-
ing Disabled Americans.” This bill 
notably incorporated a proposal (see 
Generalized Benefit Offset, below) to 
introduce work incentives, along with 
several other SSDI reform elements.
Lawmakers are beginning the 
process of evaluating many “pre-enti-
tlement” reform proposals for intro-
ducing early intervention programs to 
help workers remain in the workforce 
for longer, revising SSDI’s procedures 
for determining allowances, and 
combating fraud. But they should also 
consider changing the program’s ben-
efit structure—a “post-entitlement” 
reform to improve incentives for 
SSDI beneficiaries to return to work, 
if they can, without the threat of los-
ing their SSDI eligibility. Reforms of 
this nature would increase the earning 
 1  CRS	Report	R43054,	“Social	Security	Disability	 Insurance	
(DI)	Reform:	An	Overview	of	Proposals	to	Manage	the	Growth	
in	the	DI	Rolls,”	January	9,	2015.
 2  Nicole	Maestas,	Kathleen	J.	Mullen,	Alexander	Strand,	
“Does	Disability	 Insurance	Receipt	Discourage	Work?		Us-
ing	Examiner	Assignment	to	Estimate	Causal	Effects	of	DI	
Receipt,”	American	Economic	Review	103,	no.	5	(2013):	p.	
1797-1829.
 3  Eric	French,	Jae	Song,	“The	Effect	of	Disability	Insurance	Re-
ceipt	on	Labor	Supply:	A	Dynamic	Analysis,”	Federal	Reserve	
Bank	of	Chicago	Working	Paper	no.	2012-12,	2012.
 4  For	additional	background	information	on	the	SSDI	program,	
including	its	history,	recent	enrollment	growth	and	causes,	
changes	in	eligibility	(especially	for	conditions	that	are	non-
certifiable	medically),	the	economy’s	effects	on	the	program,	
the	application	and	adjudication	processes,	and	an	explana-
tion	on	how	SSDI	financially	traps	beneficiaries	and	keeps	
them	out	of	the	workforce,	refer	to	the	previous	Issue	Brief	
here:	http://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/
v1n8.php.
 5  This	 last	category	of	 reforms	 is	more	administrative	 in	
nature.	Examples	of	such	reforms	could	encompass	elimi-
nation	of	the	early	retirement	option	at	62;	increased	work	
requirements,	both	recent	and	total;	adjusted	age	categories	
for	vocational	factors;	inclusion	of	Social	Security	Adminis-
tration	representation	at	Administrative	Law	Judge	hearings;	
updating	of	SSA’s	listing	of	impairments;	increasing	the	inci-
dence	of	Continuing	Disability	Reviews;	supported	work	poli-
cies	in	tandem	with	experience	rating	for	employer	payroll	
tax	rates;	employer-sponsored	private	disability	 insurance;	
noTES
•	 1956	–	SSDI	established.	
•	 1968	–	The	first	of	11	revenue	reallocations	by	Congress	across	the	OASI	and	SSDI	trust	funds	(in	both	direc-
tions)9
•	 1980	–	Social	Security	Disability	Amendments	of	1980		which	expanded	use	of	continuing	disability	reviews	
(CDRs)	to	reduce	program	costs	(although	opposition	led	to	more	stringent	criteria	for	CDRs	in	1984).
•	 1983	–	Social	Security	Amendments	of	1983,	which	included	change	of	full	retirement	age	from	65	to	67	for	
those	born	after	1960.	
•	 1984	–	Social	Security	Disability	Benefits	Reform	Act	of	1984	–	Changed	medical	eligibility	criteria	for	CDRs	to	
make	it	more	difficult	to	terminate	benefits	by	requiring	evidence	of	medical	improvement	related	to	the	recipi-
ent’s	ability	to	work.	Also	required	HHS	secretary	to	revise	the	mental	disorders	criteria,	to	give	greater	weight	to	
functional	capacities	and	subjective	pain	and	less	weight	to	externally	observable	medical	factors.	Also	required	
SSA	to	consider	the	combined	effect	of	multiple	non-severe	impairments	rather	than	the	previous	requirement	for	
one	or	more	independently	severe	impairments.	
•	 1994	–	Funding	crisis	for	SSDI	prompted	reallocation	from	OASI,	and	the	SSDI	payroll	tax	rate	was	raised	from	
0.5	percent	to	0.9	percent,	while	the	OASI	rate	stayed	at	6.2	percent.
TaBlE 1: TImElInE/mIlESTonES In SSdI admInISTRaTIon
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potential of beneficiaries and remove 
the undesirable result of SSDI’s cur-
rent benefit structure—of inducing 
SSDI beneficiaries with residual work 
capability to stay out of the workforce. 
Reform efforts can be grouped 
into four categories: 
1. Providing early support services—
remediation, counseling, health care, 
and work-accommodations—to help 
those experiencing disability onset 
to remain in the workforce
2. Tightening eligibility conditions for 
program entry
3. Improving adjudication accuracy, 
preventing fraud, and reducing 
improper payments
4. Replacing work disincentives in 
SSDI’s benefit structure with work 
incentives to induce work-capable 
SSDI beneficiaries to return to work 
voluntarily5
The challenge in designing incen-
tives for workers to delay or forego 
applying to SSDI lies in the proper 
identification of workers at risk of 
developing debilitating conditions 
well before their condition deterio-
rates to the point of no return and 
compels an application to SSDI. Early 
provision of employment supports, 
health care services, and counseling 
can prolong time on the job and may 
postpone or prevent eventual entry 
into SSDI. But comprehensive and 
regular testing of the SSDI insured 
worker population to provide such 
supports would be costly and may 
induce worker behavior to qualify for 
such services. 
Introducing employer incentives 
to provide employment supports to 
workers—for example, by experience 
rating SSDI payroll taxes—is also 
not without pitfalls. Such a policy 
may make employers reluctant to hire 
workers with disabilities. In general, 
policies to prevent or delay applica-
tions to SSDI may prove costly and 
may be difficult to enact because 
SSDI benefits constitute an “earned 
right” under the law. Program enroll-
ment growth arising from procedural 
shortcomings, loopholes, lax enforce-
ment of eligibility rules, or insufficient 
training of adjudicators therefore 
should be addressed with direct 
reforms to those program elements.
The challenge with tighten-
ing eligibility conditions is the risk 
of alienating well-organized and 
invested constituencies of workers, 
beneficiaries, and disability advocacy 
groups. But the challenge to providing 
incentives for beneficiaries to return 
to the workforce arises directly from 
SSDI’s definition of disability and the 
operational eligibility conditions that 
emerge from it. A system that con-
tinues to pay benefits only if earnings 
remain below a low dollar limit, and 
only if there is insufficient medical 
improvement, will naturally induce 
beneficiaries to remain out of the 
workforce and to not seek improve-
ments in their health and vocational 
abilities with any urgency. 
The remainder of this brief exam-
ines the creation of incentives for 
SSDI beneficiaries with residual work 
capacity to resume work at above-
SGA levels without fear of benefit 
termination.6 This is accomplished by 
providing a generalized benefit offset 
(GBO) that is scaled to beneficiary 
earnings. Policies in this vein have 
been instituted in other countries, 
including Norway, Britain, Sweden 
and Australia.7 
ThE GEnERalIzEd BEnEFIT 
oFFSET modEl
Under the current system, a disabled 
individual who is earning “too much” 
(i.e., someone who consistently 
surpasses the dollar earnings limit of 
the Trial Work Period (TWP) rule) is 
suspended from SSDI benefits.8 This 
effectively discourages individuals with 
residual work capacity—including 
those who may be going through the 
and	improved	early	intervention	programs.
 6  As	with	Old-Age	and	Survivors	Insurance	(OASI),	SSDI	ben-
efits	are	based	on	a	worker’s	past	earnings.	Individuals	must	
be	unable	to	sustain	earnings	at	or	above	the	substantial	
gainful	activity	(SGA)	level	because	of	a	mental	or	physical	
impairment	that	is	expected	to	last	at	least	one	year	or	result	
in	death.	The	current	monthly	 level	of	SGA	is	$1,090	for	
non-blind	and	$1,820	for	blind	individuals.	Eligibility	for	SSDI	
also	qualifies	the	disabled	worker’s	spouse	and	children	for	
dependent	benefits.
 7  Andreas	Ravndal	Kostol	and	Magne	Mogstad,	“How	Fi-
nancial	 Incentives	 Induce	Disability	 Insurance	Recipients	
to	Return	 to	Work”	http://www.nber.org/papers/w19016.	
Richard	Burkhauser,	Mary	Daly,	Duncan	McVicar,	Roger	
Wilkins,	“Disability	Benefit	Growth	and	Disability	Reform	in	
the	U.S.:	Lessons	from	Other	OECD	Nations,”	IZA	Journal	of	
Labor	Policy,	February	20,	2014.
 8  A	month	counts	 toward	the	Trial	Work	Period	 if	earnings	
exceed	a	dollar	 limit	applicable	during	the	year.	 	 In	2015	
the	limit	is	$780.	Accrual	of	9	TWP	months	within	the	last	
60	months	results	in	benefit	suspension.		Benefit	termina-
tion	occurs	if	earnings	remain	above	the	SGA	level	during	
the	Extended	Trial	Work	Period	(ETWP)	of	an	additional	36	
months.	
 9  David	C.	Stapleton,	Social	Security	Bulletin,	Vol.	71	No.	3,	
2011.	Kathy	Ruffing	and	Paul	N.	Van	de	Water,	“Congress	
Needs	 to	Boost	Disability	 Insurance	Share	of	Payroll	Tax	
by	2016,”	 available	 at	 http://www.cbpp.org/research/
congress-needs-to-boost-disability-insurance-share-of-
payroll-tax-by-2016.
noTES
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lengthy SSDI application process, or 
who have enrolled in SSDI but have 
adapted to their health conditions and 
regained some work capacity—from 
earning more than $13,000 per year, 
to avoid jeopardizing their SSDI eligi-
bility. The fear of suffering a relapse 
in one’s health condition after losing 
SSDI eligibility because of high earn-
ings may be inducing most beneficia-
ries to disengage from the labor force. 
Accordingly, the data on who 
among SSDI beneficiaries actually can 
and cannot work is poor. This situa-
tion has also plagued SSA-operated 
pilot projects—including Ticket to 
Work, Benefit Offset Pilot Dem-
onstration, Benefit Offset National 
Demonstration—which were designed 
to encourage beneficiaries to return to 
the labor force by offering to reduce 
benefits by $1 for every $2 of earn-
ings above the SGA level. In these 
cases, naturally risk-averse individuals 
who have previously experienced a 
work-limiting disability may not be 
convinced that they will retain eligi-
bility for SSDI, should they need it, 
after the demonstration programs are 
terminated.
A better system would be one 
that: 1) pays individuals to rejoin the 
workforce if they can by offering a 
subsidy to earnings at the margin, and 
2) maintains eligibility even in periods 
when the benefit is not paid, thereby 
readjusting SSDI benefits upon any 
decline or loss of earnings due to 
fluctuating health or labor market 
conditions.  
As illustrated by Figure 1, the 
proposed GBO system incorporates 
these two elements, and in so doing 
circumvents the disincentive of the 
cash cliff associated with losing SSDI 
benefits under current law at the SGA 
threshold. 
Consider the following styl-
ized example. Under current law, a 
beneficiary with a primary insurance 
amount (PIA) of $1,150 and zero 
earnings has total income of $1,150. 
If the beneficiary joins the work-force 
and begins to earn wages, total income 
increases dollar-for-dollar with earn-
ings until earnings reach the SGA 
level of $1,090. When earnings equal 
SGA, total income equals $2,240. 
However, earning just one dollar more 
than SGA disqualifies the benefi-
ciary and total income falls to $1,091. 
When earnings equal SGA, therefore, 
the beneficiary’s total income encoun-
ters a “cash cliff ”—as shown by the 
line in red dashed line in Figure 1. 
Under GBO, the safety-net 
benefit (the line in blue dashes) is 
increased slightly above the PIA 
($1,150) at zero earnings but declines 
at a constant rate as earnings increase. 
In exchange for the enhancement to 
the benefit at zero earnings, ben-
eficiary earnings are subject to a tax 
when earnings are positive but low. 
However, the tax rate on earnings is 
reduced as earnings increase, and it is 
eventually converted into a subsidy at 
FIGURE 1: GBo and cURREnT-laW SSdI IncomE SchEdUlES  
(SSdI PRImaRy InSURancE amoUnT = $1,150)
Trust Fund Benefits Earnings Tax (-)/Subsidy(+)
GBO Income Current Law Income
Income Dollars                                                          Earnings Dollars 
Source: Author’s GBO benefit design.
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higher earnings levels. This earnings 
subsidy is the wage-incentive compo-
nent of GBO’s benefit structure.
The sum of earnings, the safety-
net benefit, and the wage incentive 
payment make up the beneficiary’s 
total income (shown as the unbroken 
blue line in Figure 1). It shows that 
for a considerable range of earn-
ings beyond the SGA level, working 
beneficiaries could have much higher 
total income under GBO than under 
current law. Indeed, the slope of the 
total GBO income is steeper than the 
45 degree line for earnings around the 
SGA level—providing a significant 
net incentive for SSDI beneficiaries to 
rejoin the workforce. 
This type of two-pronged benefit 
structure for SSDI, which includes 
full protection of working beneficia-
ries’ SSDI eligibility—the right to quit 
work (for health or any other reason) 
and have full safety-net SSDI benefits 
restored—would eliminate the fear of 
permanent loss of SSDI benefits and 
would likely induce stronger efforts by 
SSDI beneficiaries to return to work. 
Restructuring the SSDI benefit in this 
manner is likely to work better than 
the aforementioned “$1 for $2” ben-
efit offset work-incentive pilots and 
demonstration projects that the Social 
Security Administration is currently 
testing. Those pilots eliminate the cur-
rent law cash cliff, but replace it with 
a very poor work incentive system. 
Indeed, the “$1 for $2” benefit-offset 
ratio may be viewed by beneficiaries 
as a 50 percent marginal tax rate on 
earnings—and, thus, not a very strong 
return-to-work incentive. GBO’s 
benefit structure, in effect, reverses the 
rationale for SSDI benefits, switching 
it from a payment to remain idle to 
one that rewards work. 
Under GBO, work-incentive sub-
sidy payments to working beneficiaries 
would be funded via an annual provi-
sion to SSA from the general bud-
get account (mandatory rather than 
discretionary, similar to the funding of 
non-premium-covered expenditures 
for Medicare Parts B and D). 
Adopting GBO would be very 
beneficial for SSDI beneficiaries and 
the national economy given current 
program conditions. With many 
workers qualifying for SSDI benefits 
during economic downturns on the 
basis of difficult-to-medically-certify 
health diagnoses, beneficiaries’ residual 
work abilities remain unknown. The 
problem is compounded by the cash-
cliff under current laws which may be 
inducing many work-capable benefi-
ciaries to remain out of the workforce 
for fear of losing eligibility to SSDI 
benefits. GBO’s stronger work incen-
tive structure would reveal who among 
SSDI beneficiaries can and cannot 
work by providing them with a reason 
to voluntarily make choices appropri-
ate to their specific health conditions 
and residual abilities. Those who can 
work would choose to do so, to take 
advantage of GBO’s earnings subsidy. 
Those who remain out of the labor 
force despite GBO’s work incentive 
system would reveal their health con-
ditions to be fully disabling. 
Note, however, that GBO’s suc-
cess depends crucially on excluding 
earnings as a criterion for withdraw-
ing SSDI eligibility from those who 
previously were deemed qualified for 
SSDI benefits based on the decision 
criteria written into law. For GBO 
to operate effectively, a certifiable 
medical improvement relative to the 
condition that triggered SSDI eligi-
bility should be the only reason for 
which beneficiaries could be disquali-
fied from SSDI.
ESTImaTInG GBo’S BUdGET 
coST comPaREd To 
cURREnT SSdI RUlES
There is considerable uncertainty 
about the extent to which SSDI 
beneficiaries might expand their labor 
force participation under GBO. The 
only way to fully reveal this informa-
tion, of course, would be to directly 
and fully introduce GBO in place 
of SSDI’s current benefit system. 
Doing so is unlikely to involve new 
and significant taxpayer costs unless 
GBO induces a commensurate and 
beneficial behavioral response from 
SSDI beneficiaries to return to work. 
Thus, whereas some other SSDI 
reform proposals require up-front 
investments before reaping SSDI cost 
savings, GBO requires an up-front 
beneficial outcome before incurring 
any taxpayer costs. 
Estimating GBO’s cost ahead 
of its implementation inherently 
requires one to estimate the behavioral 
response that GBO would produce in 
terms of return-to-work by SSDI ben-
eficiaries. However, if GBO induces 
a significant number of workers to 
begin earning more than the SGA 
level, GBO’s cost should be measured 
against the pre-behavioral-change cost 
of maintaining current law—where 
current law benefit payments would 
continue. Comparing GBO’s cost 
against current law when the latter is 
evaluated on a post-behavioral change 
basis—where it would be zero for 
those who commence earning more 
6publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
than SGA because of GBO—would 
understate the cost of the status 
quo relative to implementing GBO. 
Unfortunately, there is little informa-
tion available publicly to evaluate 
GBO’s costs relative to projections 
under current SSDI laws. A use-
ful step would be for Social Security 
actuaries to provide cost estimates for 
a GBO-type reform based on the best 
information available to them. 
It should be noted that, notwith-
standing the paucity of informa-
tion about its potential behavioral 
impact, implementing GBO is likely 
to prove beneficial. It would act as a 
backstop to reduce the economic loss 
from inaccurate SSDI allowances by 
incentivizing beneficiaries to return 
to work, if they can. Thus, it would 
directly generate the missing infor-
mation over time about beneficiaries’ 
remaining work capabilities. Second, 
GBO is complementary to, and likely 
to enhance the beneficial effects of, 
other pre- and post-entitlement 
reforms that lawmakers and others 
have proposed. Third, the additional 
budget cost that GBO may require, if 
and when beneficiaries return to work, 
is likely to be recouped by gains in 
economic productivity and output and 
by improvements in working benefi-
ciaries’ living standards. Fourth, work-
ing beneficiaries under GBO would 
also accrue higher retirement benefits 
after they are shifted to OASI upon 
reaching their full retirement ages. 
Fifth, GBO is unlikely to incent entry 
into SSDI by workers with marginal 
health impairments, as the waiting 
time for being approved would only 
hinder their accrual of earnings and 
OASI retirement benefits. Overall, 
GBO is likely to provide workers and 
disabled beneficiaries better economic 
protection against market and health 
risks without compromising work 
incentives. And last, but not least, 
GBO would increase the psycho-
logical well-being of individuals 
with disabilities from greater com-
munity participation and self-support 
through work. 
conclUSIon
The factors behind the escalation in 
SSDI enrollments and outlays are 
complex but it’s clear that deeper 
program reforms are overdue. The 
focus on providing SSDI benefits to 
only those who do not work above the 
SGA likely dampens labor participa-
tion and induces those with medical 
impairments to seek out and remain 
permanently dependent on SSDI 
benefits. 
Legislative initiatives to directly 
alter SSDI procedures and tighten 
eligibility criteria, or to increase SSDI 
payroll taxes, will face very strong 
resistance from well-organized politi-
cal interest groups concerned with 
preserving the status quo. Nonethe-
less, policymakers today appreciate 
the financial jeopardy that the SSDI 
program is facing and the need to look 
beyond short-term resource realloca-
tions from the OASI trust fund. 
It is against this backdrop that the 
generalized benefit offset model, or 
GBO, offers a more robust approach 
than prior SSA pilots to incentivize 
labor market reentry by SSDI ben-
eficiaries with residual work capacity. 
Introduced as part of a broader set of 
reforms in S. 3003 during the 113th 
Congress, it is an approach that can 
be combined with other reforms and 
merits continued evaluation by law-
makers serious about tackling SSDI’s 
financial problems at a deeper level. 
Straightforward economic analysis 
suggests that GBO would provide 
stronger work incentives with siz-
able economic benefits at minimal 
cost. That’s because GBO reverses the 
reason why SSDI beneficiaries receive 
payments. It is a model that moves 
away from effectively discouraging 
beneficiaries from returning to work 
and towards encouraging those who 
can return to work to do so. It accom-
plishes this by introducing a wage-
incentive payment linked to earnings 
and offsets its cost by reducing the 
trust fund-financed benefits of those 
who can work. And GBO protects 
SSDI beneficiaries’ eligibility for the 
program’s safety net benefits because 
of earnings, as job separations for 
health or other reasons lead to safety 
net benefits being reinstated. Such 
a flexible and two-pronged SSDI 
benefit system is more likely to induce 
work-capable beneficiaries to return to 
work—a choice many SSDI insured 
workers would make voluntarily, but 
cannot, given the current “cash cliff ” 
at the SGA threshold. And SSDI 
beneficiaries would continue to accrue 
earnings under GBO to potentially 
obtain higher OASI benefits upon 
reaching retirement age. 
In addition to addressing the 
SSDI trust fund shortfalls through 
short-term resource transfer from 
OASI, Congress should consider a 
new, GBO-like benefit structure for 
SSDI to improve the overall financial 
welfare of individuals with disabilities 
and increase national productivity  
and output.
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